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-
-
- Internet Experiment Note: 191 C. Sunshine
- D. Cohen
- J. Postel
- ISI
- July 1981
-
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
- INTRODUCTION
-
- This memo comments on recent IEN's by Eric Rosen of BBN (numbers 182,
- 183, 184, 187, 188, 189) [1,2,3,4,5,6]. We think these notes raise
- some important and interesting issues which require further
- discussion. In the following we focus on the points of disagreement
- (but don't assume that we agree with something simply because we
- don't mention it here). After a brief general comment we discuss
- each note in turn.
-
- There are some good points raised in this series. Unfortunately the
- presentation is both verbose and incomplete. There is nothing wrong
- with taking a certain aspect of a topic and exploring it at length,
- but these memos seemingly present all available alternatives and
- select the "best" for further development. Our concern is that, in
- fact, not all alternatives are studied, and not all evaluation
- criteria are given the proper weight in selecting the "best"
- alternative. A minor problem is the informality of the references.
- It is unclear exactly which earlier memos, reports, and papers the
- author has in mind in some of the discussion, and it is unclear if
- the author is aware of some very relevant material. In some sections
- it appears that the author is unfamiliar with much of the relevant
- material, and hence fails to include important points in his
- presentation.
-
- IEN 182
-
- This note on "Issues in Buffer Management" is, in the main, a
- description of buffer management in the ARPANET IMPs. This is quite
- useful and should be food for thought for gateway designers and
- implementers since gateways may have some of the same constraints and
- concerns in buffer management as IMPs. However, the differences that
- do exist in the goals for gateways and IMPs are not taken into
- account, so the policies adopted for IMPs are not necessarily
- appropriate for gateways. Differences in the level of reliability of
- delivery, and the end-to-end virtual circuit vs. the datagram style
- of service can lead to substantial differences in the requirements
- for buffer management.
-
- This is a useful memo in that it exposes a good deal about the buffer
- management polices used in the ARPANET IMPs, information that is not
- easily found elsewhere. But it is contains some weakly supported
-
-
-
- Sunshine & Cohen & Postel Page [1]
-
-
-
- July 1981 IEN 191
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- overly broad conclusions that seem to ignore and sometimes contradict
- existing results in this area.
-
- IEN 183
-
- This memo presents a proposal for a logical addressing mechanism in
- the ARPANET, and includes a good deal of discussion of alternatives.
- Interested readers should see earlier IEN's on the subject from MIT,
- ISI, and Xerox, plus the classic paper by Shoch, and recent work on
- "naming authorities" at Xerox, which the author fails to credit or
- reference [7,8,9].
-
- We prefer the more commonly used term "name" to the phrase "logical
- address" which the author uses.
-
- The key proposal is to include a name-to-address lookup function in
- the source switches of a network so that the "user" will not have to
- supply ("physical") addresses. This seems a worthwhile goal, but the
- meaning of "user" seems confused between (1) people or application
- programs using the network, and (2) network access software (such as
- NCP or TCP) supporting (1) in the hosts. The author seems oblivious
- of this distinction.
-
- Everyone agrees that category (1) "users" should be able to use
- names. Of course, most ARPANET hosts' category (2) software already
- provides this function (the host table) for category (1) "users".
- The proper discussion should be whether this function is best located
- in the switches, or in the network support software of the hosts, but
- this is not explicitly addressed by the author.
-
- The author presents a reasonable approach to implementing a name
- lookup function without requiring broadcast of dynamic changes to all
- participants. A basic table of all potentially usable addresses for
- each name must be distributed to all parties (the "authorized"
- table), but this is expected to change relatively slowly. Entries in
- this table are assumed usable ("effective") until an explicit
- exception message ("destination not accessable") results from using
- them. The unusable markings are reset after a time interval.
-
- We agree that this is a worthwhile proposal, but the placement of
- this function in the hosts, the switches, or a separate name lookup
- service needs further discussion. Since most hosts are already
- performing this function as noted above, it is clearly within their
- capabilities. An advantage of placement in the switches seems to be
- prevention of "spoofing" since hosts can only send/receive messages
- from/for a specified name if that name is "authorized" for the
-
-
-
- Page [2] Sunshine & Cohen & Postel
-
-
-
- IEN 191 July 1981
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- addresses they are physically attached to. Of course this requires
- source and destination switches to check messages in a "trusted"
- fashion.
-
- There is a small inconsistency in the author's discussion of
- source-only vs. intermediate ("tandem") node name lookup. At the top
- of page 11, it is stated that the tandem nodes will be "no more
- likely" than the source node to have new information during a
- transient update period. However, on page 12-13, it is pointed out
- (correctly) that tandem nodes likely WILL produce a "better route
- selection ... if delay changes or topology changes take place while a
- packet is in transit."
-
- There will be substantial modification needed to the host software in
- order to implement this scheme. It is proposed (we think) that both
- the current scheme and the logical address scheme be available at the
- same time. The details of the logical address are not very clear,
- but a 16-bit logical address is suggested, which would require a
- character string to number lookup in the hosts to make it convenient.
-
- IEN 184
-
- This memo claims that the previous work on the Internet is deficient
- due to reliance on an inadequate model of the structure of the
- Internet. IEN 184 claims to present a new model of the Internet that
- does provide a basis for future work.
-
- The proposed model of internetwork operation views the gateways more
- explicitly as switching nodes, with the hosts attached to these
- nodes. In particular, each host is multi-hommed on all the gateways
- on the same network as the host.
-
- There is some merit to this model and the questions it raises, but
- the author is not the first to think of this viewpoint (see for
- example IEN-135 [10]). There are also some problems with this model
- that the author seems unaware of.
-
- This new model might be acceptable if one wanted to build a super
- ARPANET based solely on lines and super-IMPs, but if one is planning
- to include other technologies such as broadcast satellite and
- broadcast local networks, the proposed model has serious flaws.
-
- For example, two hosts on the same net may still wish to use Internet
- protocols to communicate. In the author's model, they would have to
- do so by going through an intermediate gateway on their net, since by
- definition, no hosts can communicate directly over a "Pathway" with
-
-
-
- Sunshine & Cohen & Postel Page [3]
-
-
-
- July 1981 IEN 191
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- no intervening "Switch." This is clearly inefficient in the intranet
- case, and one way in which it differs from the ARPANET. This would
- also be true in many single broadcast nets where there are no
- intervening switches between hosts even at the single network level
- of "Network Structure."
-
- This memo fails to consider the impact on the host systems. Host
- will be designed to use a common approach to communication with other
- hosts whether they be across the room or across the world. With the
- existing model and Internet Protocol, the same procedures and formats
- can be used between hosts on the same network and between hosts many
- networks apart (though different performance parameters may be
- necessary).
-
- The model developed in the Internet Working Group and described by
- Cerf (IEN-48 [11]) continues to be the most reasonable basis for
- developing the Internet.
-
- IEN 187
-
- This memo assumes the model (of IEN 184) of hosts always sending and
- receiving internet traffic via an "Internet Switch". It goes on to
- describe the interactions of a host and an internet switch, and then
- criticizes the existing Internet Protocol for not being a perfect
- host-switch interface protocol.
-
- We cannot possibly take on all of the topics and "lessons" presented,
- but Section 2.4 of IEN-187 on fragmentation provides a good example
- of what is wrong with these reports. Again, the author seems unaware
- of previous important work on this subject, for example IEN-20 by
- Shoch (expanded and published in Computer Networks in 1979) [13], or
- the paper by Sunshine on interconnection of networks published in
- Computer Networks in 1977 [14]. If the author had read these, he
- might have avoided several serious deficiencies in his presentation:
-
- 1. After a long discussion of the evils of final destination (or
- internet) fragmentation, the author reveals his preferred approach
- of hop-by-hop (or intranet) fragmentation as if he invented the
- idea.
-
- 2. There is an important goal that internet fragmentation
- supports, but intranet fragmentation does not: independent and
- possibly different routing of each fragment through different exit
- gateways from a "small packet" net (and subsequently). The author
- fails to consider this point.
-
-
-
-
- Page [4] Sunshine & Cohen & Postel
-
-
-
- IEN 191 July 1981
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- 3. In presenting scenarios (page 58) showing the evils of internet
- fragmentation, the author omits the important scenario of several
- small packet nets in a row, where repeated intranet fragmentation
- is just the WRONG thing to do.
-
- 4. Packets with the Don't Fragment flag on are not "simply lost in
- transit" (page 53) if they cannot be forwarded without
- fragmentation. Specific error packets are returned to the source
- host, which may try to resend smaller packets.
-
- 5. After all his discussion, the author admits in the final
- paragraph that destination host fragmentation is necessary anyway
- if the final network gets too large a packet. The author claims
- this will be necessary only for hosts on nets with "unusually
- small" maximum packet sizes, but in fact it will be necessary on
- all nets with less than the maximum maximum packet size of any net
- in the system if they wish to receive packets from the largest
- packet size nets.
-
- The net effect of this sort of incomplete presentation is a step
- backward from the current imperfect level of understanding of this
- important issue.
-
- The author also attacks the Type of Service (TOS), Time to Live
- (TTL), Source Routing (SR), Flow Control (FC), and Fault Isolation
- (FI) features of IP and ICMP.
-
- On Type of Service the author tells us for ten pages all the bad
- things about the Internet Protocol provision for TOS, while agreeing
- it is an important concept, but has nothing different to offer,
- except some vague notion that service catagories should correspond
- more closely to application types.
-
- On Time to Live the author complains that there is an inconsistency
- since the TTL is stated to be in seconds, and that the gateways must
- decrement the TTL by one, and that the gateways are expected to
- process datagrams faster than one a second. If one assumes that the
- intention is to guarantee that datagrams stay alive as long as the
- TTL, he is right. But the intention is really to guarantee that they
- disappear before TTL. So TTL is an upper bound on how long the
- datagram may exist. Most reliable transport protocols assume a
- maximum datagram lifetime (sometimes unknowningly) for the correct
- operation of their reliability procedures [15].
-
- On Source Routing the author suggests that this feature exists due
- only to problems with existing routing procedures and for
-
-
-
- Sunshine & Cohen & Postel Page [5]
-
-
-
- July 1981 IEN 191
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- experiments, and that any really adequate routing procedure in the
- gateways will eliminate the need for source routing in normal
- operations. We suggest that the Internet will be a much more dynamic
- environment than the author has yet imagined and that source routing
- will be essential to reach through the Internet to local environments
- not fully integrated into the main Internet routing world.
-
- On Flow Control and Fault Isolation the author indicates that the
- current mechanisms are inadequate, but does not suggest workable
- alternatives. On FC the ICMP "Source Quench" message is cited as a
- case of "choke packet" flow control which the author does not believe
- in (page 64). Earlier (page 63) the author complains that "source
- quench" is only advisory, and later (page 66) the author makes vague
- suggestions that a better flow control scheme would use advisory
- messages to suggest that datagrams had been discarded (exactly what
- source quench does).
-
- All in all this memo comes across as an attack on the Internet
- Protocol, with few suggestions for improvement. But it is based on
- an assumption: that the Internet Protocol is a host-switch access
- protocol. This assumption requires further discussion.
-
- IEN 188
-
- This memo describes logical addressing in the Internet, primarily by
- recasting the method of IEN 183 in generalized terms. There are a
- number of inaccuracies and omissions in the discussion. One serious
- limitation is failure to consider the case of hosts sending Internet
- datagrams to each other directly on a single net as discussed above.
-
- On page 4 (middle), the author correctly states that IP addresses are
- hierarchical, but incorrectly states that their second component is
- necessarily a "physical address." In fact, it may be a name or
- "logical address" in networks that provide that capability (but must
- be carried in 24 bits).
-
- On page 7, the author proposes using a "unique name which is
- meaningful at each level of internet hierarchy." This seems to be a
- strong violation of layering, and as the author admits, would require
- the switches in every constituent network to "understand" and be able
- to lookup the names, probably an intolerable demand on individual
- network autonomy.
-
- On page 34, the author's claim that hierarchical addressing requires
- less table space than flat addressing is false. His justification is
- incomprehensible to us, particularly since he has just finished
-
-
-
- Page [6] Sunshine & Cohen & Postel
-
-
-
- IEN 191 July 1981
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- proposing an "area" addressing scheme similar to hierarchical schemes
- in order to reduce table sizes!
-
- In the detailed model of operation given in Section 3.4, an important
- step is omitted when the first sentence states, "Let's assume that a
- source Host has given a message to a source Switch ..." How does the
- source host pick the source switch? In fact, it must pick both a
- network level (e.g., IMP) and internet level (gateway) switch,
- assuming it is multi-homed, which at least at the internet level is
- quite likely. In order to make this selection, the host will have to
- have a table giving the best switch (at each level) for each possible
- destination name. But these are precisely the sort of tables the
- author's scheme is meant to avoid having in the hosts. In light of
- the comment above about hosts talking to each other directly on the
- same net, the hosts must at least know the names and addresses of
- every other host on their own net.
-
- The treatment of mobile hosts is quite brief and offers no
- improvement over previously proposed solutions.
-
- IEN 189
-
- This memo discusses routing in the Internet, and proposes that the
- existing gateway routing procedure be replaced by the SFP procedure
- now used in the ARPANET. This is surely a useful suggestion. The
- note does however raise a number of issues in its examples of routing
- problems that indicate an incomplete understanding of the whole area.
-
- The note proposes a "gateway discovery protocol" that could be
- provided by individual nets. This idea seems worthwhile, although it
- is not clear how many individual nets would be willing to make such
- additions. We should like to point out that it is also possible to
- perform this function directly among gateways in networks which
- support broadcast or group addressing.
-
- The discussion of routing alternatives makes generally sound if
- qualitative conclusions, but a few details are confused. The
- discussion of throughput performance on page 41 assumes TCP will
- operate with a small enough window over a high delay path so that
- throughput is reduced, but this is precisely the situation in which
- proper "tuning" requires a large window, which would allow high
- throughput.
-
- The analogy with "whole picture" algorithms on pages 44-45 fails to
- mention that in the whole picture scenario, each person would have to
- get a piece of paper 100 times bigger than with the local scheme, and
-
-
-
- Sunshine & Cohen & Postel Page [7]
-
-
-
- July 1981 IEN 191
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- hence this approach has an information distribution requirement that
- is much higher.
-
- This memo contains several informal citations that could be usefully
- spelled out for the IEN audience. The author mentions algorithms by
- Gallager (page 17), Dijkstra (page 20), and Floyd (page 20), all
- without references. It is safe to say that any list of references
- containing only the author and his coworkers (as consistently done in
- this series) cannot be adequate.
-
- One particular example provokes the following response:
-
- Please replace the second paragraph of page 49 of IEN-189 with the
- following paragraph:
-
- "In fact the situation could be even worse. If Switches in
- Boston know nothing about what happening inside the building on
- 4676 Admiralty Way then data for the North section of the 11th
- floor which arrives at the South section of the 11th floor is
- then sent back from the South section to Boston for alternate
- routing will just loop back to the South section. The data
- will be stuck in an infinite loop, never reaching its
- destination. In IEN 179 [12] Danny Cohen proposed a regional
- scheme like this, apparently not realizing that it suffers from
- loops. His proposal also includes a form of hierarchical
- addressing which is closely bound up with routing, so that a
- Switch is Boston might not even be able to distinguish data for
- the South section from data for the North section. That is, in
- Cohen's scheme, data for the South section and data for the
- North section would be indistinguishable at the Boston
- Switches; all such data would appear to be addressed to the
- South section. Only the Switches at the South section would
- look further down the address hierarchy to determine whether
- the data needs further forwarding to the North section. Any
- such scheme is hopelessly loop-prone, except in a Network
- Structure whose connectivity is extraordinarily rich, much more
- so than the Catenet's will ever be."
-
- Since the above suggestion was merely to follow the routing
- strategy used by the phone companies, TELENET and others, you
- should warn them immediately about this hopelessly loop-prone
- situation.
-
- I believe that if the Boston Switch has ALL the information about
- EVERYthing, EVERYwhere it would be in position to make better
- decisions, ALWAYS, especially if that information is updated with
-
-
-
- Page [8] Sunshine & Cohen & Postel
-
-
-
- IEN 191 July 1981
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- absolutely ZERO time delay. If this information is absolutely
- free (in terms of communication, storage and processing) it may be
- dumb not to make every Switch always know everything about
- everything, down to (or "up to"?) the finest granularity
- (location? site? process? file? register? bit?). However, if this
- is not absolutely free, some compromises may have to take place.
-
- Oh, one point which I did not quite follow: why if the
- Nevada/California lines are broken forever, Boston is never told
- about it - as described by you? By the way, what made you
- understand that the "The Switch at Nevada would look further down
- the address hierarchy to determine whether the data needs further
- forwarding to California" ?
-
- I highly recommend that you get hold of any telephone directory
- and read the area-codes tables. This may help you understanding
- that the California area codes are neither above, nor below, nor
- further on any hierarchy than the Nevada ones, and vice versa.
-
- This is a very subtle point which may escape the casual reader.
- Mastering this idea may help you understand what IEN-179 is all
- about. In short, IEN-179 is not an attempt to describe the ideas
- which you have in mind by using the telephone scenario, but an
- attempt (which obviously failed, at least in your case) to
- introduced old well-proven ideas from other communication arenas
- into ours.
-
- SUMMARY
-
- In summary we are glad to have this information and these opinions
- presented for discussion in the Internet Working Group, and we hope
- that others will speak up with their opinions too. We are concerned
- that too many will be so overwhelmed by the wide ranging arguments to
- notice that some important considerations were not mentioned.
-
- We especially want to make clear that a fundamentally different model
- of the Internet architecture is proposed by Rosen, and that we have
- serious reservations about aspects of that model.
-
-
-
-
-
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- Sunshine & Cohen & Postel Page [9]
-
-
-
- July 1981 IEN 191
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- REFERENCES
-
- [1] Rosen, E., "Issues in Buffer Management", IEN 182, Bolt Beranek
- and Newman, May 1981.
-
- [2] Rosen, E., "Logical Addressing", IEN 183, Bolt Beranek and
- Newman, May 1981.
-
- [3] Rosen, E., "Issues in Internetting Part 1: Modelling the
- Internet", IEN 184, Bolt Beranek and Newman, May 1981.
-
- [4] Rosen, E., "Issues in Internetting Part 2: Accessing the
- Internet", IEN 187, Bolt Beranek and Newman, June 1981.
-
- [5] Rosen, E., "Issues in Internetting Part 3: Addressing", IEN 188,
- Bolt Beranek and Newman, June 1981.
-
- [6] Rosen, E., "Issues in Internetting Part 4: Routing", IEN 189,
- Bolt Beranek and Newman, June 1981.
-
- [7] Clark, D., "A Proposal for Addressing and Routing in the
- Internet", IEN 46, MIT/Laboratory for Computer Science, June
- 1978.
-
- [8] Cerf, V., "Internet Addressing and Naming in a Tactical
- Environment", IEN 110, Information Processing Techniques Office,
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, August 1979.
-
- [9] Shoch, J., "Inter-Network Naming, Addressing, and Routing",
- Proceedings 17th IEEE Computer Society International Conference,
- pp72-79, September 1978.
-
- [10] Sunshine, C., "Addressing Mobile Hosts in the ARPA Internet
- Environment", IEN 135, USC/Information Sciences Institute, March
- 1980.
-
- [11] Cerf, V., "The Catenet Model for Internetworking", IEN 48,
- Information Processing Techniques Office, Defense Advanced
- Research Projects Agency, July 1978.
-
- [12] Cohen, D., "Addressing and Routing", IEN 179, USC/Information
- Sciences Institute, March 1981.
-
- [13] Shoch, J., "Packet Fragmentation in Inter-Network Protocols",
- Computer Networks, V.3, N.1, pp3-8, February 1979.
-
-
-
-
- Page [10] Sunshine & Cohen & Postel
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- IEN 191 July 1981
- Comments on Rosen's Memos
-
-
-
- [14] Sunshine, C., "Interconnection of Computer Networks", Computer
- Networks, V.1, N.3, pp175-195, January 1977.
-
- [15] Watson, R., "Timer-Based Mechanisms in Reliable Transport
- Protocol Connection Management", Computer Networks, V.5, N.1,
- pp47-56, February 1981.
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- Sunshine & Cohen & Postel Page [11]
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